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FRIEDRICH EDUARD BENEKE'S EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY.

Translated from the Fourth Volume of Richard Lange's Revised edition of Dr. Karl Schmidt's History of Pedagogics, by LOUIS F. SOLDAN.*

In his Psychology Beneke starts from the fundamental idea—derived from careful observation, that the soul is not a simple being, but that it consists of a multitude of simple powers or faculties. These however are quite different from what had been before considered elementary faculties. Beneke divides them into elementary faculties such as are born with us and may become subject to continual development, and into developed faculties that are formed out of the primary faculties, which have grown under the influence of the external world and by their own inner activity, and then exist as "formations" (i. e., as representations, concepts, desires, feelings, judgments, acts of the will, &c.) If we have been in the habit of ascribing to man one imagination, one memory, one reason, one will, these terms must be considered as mere abstract names like the terms forest, mankind, &c., in which the particular (trees, men) is comprehended. This abstract unity was taken by Psychology as single powers; what was homogeneous in regard to form was taken to be one. But, says Beneke, experience teaches the opposite. We see that the same person knows how to do a certain thing very well, but is a very poor hand at some other; or that he has a powerful will in one direc-

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*Friedrich Eduard Beneke was born in Berlin the 17th of February, 1798. He was a pupil of the Friedrich Werder Latin High School when he enlisted as a volunteer to take part in the German war of independence, in 1815. In 1816 he attended the University of Halle for the study of theology; he went to Berlin in 1817 to devote himself principally to the study of philosophy under Schleiermacher. In 1820 he became connected with the Berlin University as teacher ("privat docent"). In 1822 his lectures were prohibited by the government, which caused him to go to Göttingen in order to teach there. When that prohibition had tacitly been removed in 1827, he returned to the University of Berlin, where he was appointed *professor extraordinarius*, and after 1841 received a salary of 200 thalers a year. Having not been well for some time, he was seized in 1853 with *insomnia*. On the first of March, 1856, he disappeared suddenly, and on the fourth of June, 1856, his body was found in the water.

tion, and a very weak one in another. How can you make this agree with the theory of one understanding, one will?" The same is true in respect to memory. One and the same person can remember subjects of a certain kind easily and perfectly, but he cannot remember names; or, if his memory should happen to excel equally in regard to names, he is perhaps not able to remember numbers. Whence these different kinds of memory? If memory were but one power, the same person would remember all things with an equal degree of perfection. Antiquated psychological views hold that memory is *substance*, while the concept is the *accident*, i. e., that memory is the permanent principle, the reservoir, which receives into it the changing concepts. The new (Beneke's) psychology shows beyond contradiction, that memory does not exist at all as something outside of the concepts, but in and with them only, as their attribute, or more distinctly speaking, as their inherent principle of stability.*

Every concept that vanishes from our consciousness exists with more or less force in the inner (unconscious) life of the soul: this is memory, and memory is naught but that. Each "formation" or product of this kind, which in this manner continues an unconscious existence, Beneke calls a "vestige" or "trace." From this follows that there can be no general, formal culture,† no general culture of the memory, of the understanding. Formal culture does not extend beyond the subject or study that is taught, it does not affect the mind in general. The committing to memory of Latin words, for instance, does not give culture and power to the memory in general, but merely as far as the faculty of learning words is concerned. In the same way mathematical instruction cultivates perception and judgment in regard to mathematical matters only. Whereas memory exists merely as something inherent in

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*Concepts when they arise show a certain power to continue to exist, a certain tenacity of life. They continue in existence in the mind and may be called into consciousness. This inherent attribute of each concept, says Beneke, is what is called memory.—*Tr.*

†Formal and material culture are words but too well known in German educational writings and polemics. *Material culture* means the fact knowledge gained by instruction, *formal culture* the training which the different faculties of the mind receive by education and in the acquisition of knowledge. We usually call material culture knowledge, and formal culture discipline of the mind, or culture.—*Tr.*

the "vestiges or traces of concepts" as their principle of stability, how can the power gained in regard to the concepts of Latin words become in any way useful for the remembering of physical perceptions, or the perception of plants, of men? And whereas judgment depends on concepts, the power gained in the direction of judgment by the acquisition of certain concepts, cannot go beyond the special contents or the subject matter of such concepts.* And so with all the rest.

In the construction of his pyschological system Beneke considers everything genetically; he explains that all mental activities, for instance, imagination, conception, syllogizing, inclinations, originate in sensuous formations. Sensuous perceptions furnish the material for the imaginative representations and for the concepts relating to the external world; these concepts again are the basis for judgments, syllogisms and for all the combined mental activities; inclination, likes and dislikes have their roots in the sensuous formations of pleasure and pain (or displeasure.) Whatever has come into the mind from the external world can be separated in consciousness from what is internal, so that the purely psychical elements can come into our consciousness by themselves, and by this process of abstraction arise the purely mental formations, as for instance the concepts, to think, to imagine, to will, to remember, etc. Still perception is not a simple element; the simplest elements are the sensuous impressions. A being that has only these, as the infant in the first period of his life, is incapable of distinct perception and still more of observation. Frequent reproduction of like sensations, that continue as vestiges or 'traces' and unite according to the law of *the mutual attraction* of the similar, is required in order to potentiate sensation and to raise it to a perception. The same process is necessary to potentiate the like parts of perceptions, in order to elevate them into concepts and finally by a like manner the similar material in lower concepts is potentiated and raised to a higher concept. From this the reason becomes manifest why the scientist, the chemist, the physician perceive and observe more

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*The position Beneke takes is simply this: You cannot gain general culture from the study of special sciences. The culture which a person gains is culture in the science he studies, but not culture in general. A good arithmetician has certainly acquired strength by his mathematical work, but it is strength in regard to arithmetic merely, not mental strength in general.—*Tr.*

acutely and clearly than a person without special training in as much as the former does not see through his eyes merely; his sense of sight is assisted by his concepts.

The primary faculties which we possess at our birth, are void of objects, but not absolutely void for all that. They contain a greater or less degree of vigor (ability to retain impressions) vivacity (lively impulse for action) and a healthful susceptibility or irritability for impressions. These innate qualities, which inhere in those primary faculties, as well as those that arise at a later time, constitute a significant content of these faculties even before they are developed.

The primary faculties, being connected with the physical organs of the body without losing their character of being purely mental powers, are divided into several higher and lower classes into which they grade themselves systematically on the basis of their relative vigor, forming thus what is called the higher and lower senses of man; in this expression the physical side of man's nature (the organs) is not yet considered.*

The primary faculties are graded according to the remaining two qualities (i. e. vivacity and irritability in regard to impressions), but this gradation is not the same in different persons, it is unequal. Sight is the strongest faculty in man, almost as strong is the faculty of hearing. The faculties of taste, smell, touch and the vital faculties constitute the lower senses, for they are not in as high a degree capable of holding and retaining what they have grasped, as the faculties of seeing and hearing, and hence no one can recall (reproduce) the impressions of the former as vividly as he can those of the latter at any time. The physical organs of sense have merely the function to assist the psychical primary faculties when they receive impressions (irritation). For this reason they should be in a healthy state. In the continuation of the process by which sensations are idealized so that they can enter the soul, the primary faculties are no longer in need of the external organs. A person may have become deaf or blind, but whatever has been developed in his mind retains its untrammeled activity (in thinking, imagining, judging, willing). The muscular forces are purely physical forces which

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*It is important to notice that Beneke recognizes the spiritual element in perception; the organ of sense is capable of physical sensation, but mind is necessary to raise a mere sensation to a perception.—*Tr.*

however stand in the closest connection with the psychical faculties.

The first development of the mental senses is caused, according to constant experience, by impressions from outside which in Beneke's Psychology are called irritations or excitations. There are not two persons in whom this development takes place in the same way, for there are two causes that prevent this. In the first place the primary faculties, although they are everywhere graded into higher and lower faculties, are not found with all persons to possess the same degree of vigor. Some people have for instance a very strong power of sight, others less so. In the second place, no two human beings possess the same power of being affected by external influences (or the same amount of irritability), even if they have grown up together. This causes great diversity and difference in the development of individuals.

Irritations or excitations occur with different ratios of intensity or force; and there are five principal grades or degrees which frequently, however, pass over into each other almost imperceptibly. The excitations or irritation as affecting the primary faculties can be (1) insufficient, (2) adequate, (3) abundant, (4). gradually becoming too strong, (5) being too strong suddenly. From the first (insufficient irritation) results the sensation of displeasure, from the second (adequate irritation) the sensation that leads to distinct perception, from the third (abundant irritation) the sensation of pleasure, from the fourth (gradually excessive irritation) the sensation of surfeit or satiety and aversion; from the fifth (sudden excessive irritation) the sensation of pain. Hence each of these sensations is two-fold; it consists of faculty and irritation, and the faculties are developed in a different way by each sensation. The primary faculties are strengthened by the second class of sensations more than by the third; in the first class they experience a relaxation, in the fourth they suffer a gradual and in the fifth a sudden overstrain and hence are weakened. Whatever has become a clear concept by the accumulation of a number of "vestiges" or "traces," (impressions received into the memory) has its origin in the second grade of irritation or excitation as given above, i. e., only irritations that are neither too strong nor too weak, but simply adequate, lead to a clear concept. Mental formations or products that fill us with dislike and repugnance must have their origin in the first, fourth or fifth degree of irritation or excitation (i. e., in insufficient, gradually exces-

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sive, and suddenly excessive irritations.) Whatever mental product assumes the form of desire has its origin in the third kind of irritation or excitation (abundance of irritation). In a healthy state the soul desires only what pleases it, and it is adverse to what gives it displeasure or tones down its faculties. Whatever presents itself on the neutral ground between pleasure and displeasure, is conceived by the soul in the form of thought or representation. The soul is neither attracted by it as by the impressions of pleasure nor repulsed as in the case with objects that cause displeasure, surfeit or pain. The impressions produced by the second kind of irritation or excitation and worked into concepts and judgments by the mutual attraction of what is similar, make man a theoretical or thinking being; but he becomes a practical or acting being by the impressions that find their source in the other degrees of irritation. The mental formations or products that cause pleasure or displeasure (the "affectives" or "appreciatives") give the impulse for activity or passivity, both being regulated by the accompanying concepts. Even a mere sensation may make itself felt as an impulse; by the accumulation of vestiges or traces which the repeated impulses leave in the mind, the impulse developes into desire or aversion and in the continuation of this process of development these elements change into inclinations, which in a still higher stage are called propensities, passions or even vices. Volition we call a desire that is connected with a series of concepts, in which we already anticipate that we shall obtain what we desire, because these concepts tell us that the means for the attainment of the desired end are within our power.

The sentiments are not independent or fundamental formations or products, in the way that concepts, desires and aversions are. Sentiments are caused by the fact that two different fundamental formations or products may arise side by side in our consciousness, by which their difference, their distance from each other becomes manifest. This manifestation is and is called sentiment. Hence sentiments may be simple or compound.

From the affections which are the class of formations or products to which the sentiments or feelings belong, arise the concepts of affection by the law of the mutual attraction of the homogeneous and, like the concepts of representation or thought, become transformed into judgments and syllogisms. This process consists simply in this, that in each judgment the corresponding thought-concept (Begriff) arises in our consciousness and connects itself with the image-concept (Vorstellung). Thus the judgment is cleared from its subjective character, inasmuch as a thought-concept is a clearer psychical formation than the products from which they have arisen, because it is a psychological law that if like impressions unite in our mind they assume a clearer shape in our consciousness.

According to Beneke the soul is altogether a spiritual being. He proves that even the primary faculties (the sensuous faculties) are spiritual in their elementary shape. They bear in themselves the germ of consciousness, which develops into actual consciousness under the exciting cause of external irritations. By the accumulation of mental vestiges or traces according to the principle of homogeneity, this germ grows into clearer and more perfect consciousness in the shape of perceptions, concepts, ideas, syllogisms, judgments, &c. Thus problems are solved which could never be explained by the old psychological doctrines, for instance, why certain concepts never arise, as in persons born blind the concepts of light, day, color, or with persons born deaf, the concepts of music, sound, noise, harmony. These concepts cannot arise because the sensuous-spiritual primary faculties cannot develop in these persons. What we call the faculty of understanding is a natural consequence of our having concepts, and of the clearness of consciousness inherent in them; for the expression: I understand this, is but another form for: This is clear to me. Hence there can be no understanding of anything unless we have the requisite concepts, and these will be missing in the cases referred to, since their source, the primary faculties, could not receive any culture, because the diseased organ refuses its co-operation. Persons who are born blind, obtain the power of sight after the cataract has been removed by successful operation. They learn to see by degrees, and the concepts of color, day, &c., arise in them. Understanding, therefore, is the result of concepts, and these again are formed by the mutual attraction of the homogeneous elements in our perception. Hence the faculty of understanding does not create the concepts, as it is simply their result. In the lower senses we never obtain very clear concepts, but we do in the higher senses, those of sight and hearing. Taste and smell recur to consciousness in a very indefinite, obscure, and vague way. From this follows that consciousness as it exists in our concepts, and in a modified way and limited extent in our perceptions finds its origin in the greater vigor of the higher senses; this quality of our senses is therefore the main source of consciousness. For this reason animals, even those that show the highest organization, possess no clear developed consciousness, although they have the same senses as man, and frequently exhibit in them a greater susceptibility to irritations, and greater vivacity. But their senses lack human vigor entirely; compared with those of man they are altogether lower senses. Hence even the most intelligent animals have merely a kind of *analogon* to the human understanding. Whatever has made an impression on them is retained in a very inefficient manner. These statements show that there is no ground for the accusation of materialism which has been brought forth against Beneke; with him even the sensuous is of spiritual character, and it has the name "sensuous" for the sole reason that it is capable of receiving external impressions. The primary faculties are spiritual-sensuous faculties; they are not physical but psychical powers in elementary form. In Dressler's essay: "Is Beneke a Materialist?" the supposed materialism of Beneke has been thoroughly refuted.

The value of the pedagogical results of Beneke's Psychology should not be underestimated. True enough it is that Pestalozzi's system of instruction already required the teacher to appeal to the senses of the pupil by beginning instruction with the training of the perceptive powers. But Pestalozzi's adherents have never considered the question sufficiently how much the value of their method depends on the manner in which it is applied. Beneke demands with good reason that care must be used in regard to the very first impressions on the infant soul, as all future development depends on the sensuous beginning. (On this observation he bases his argument in favor of the corresponding views and demands of Friedrich Froebel). "Guard the weak faculties against all injury by excessive irritation or excitation, but look to it that the first perceptions are of sufficient copiousness, variety, vigor, vivacity and freshness. Do not present too many nor too few impressions to the child; do not hurry it from one impression to the other for by such a method the child will be prevented from observing and perceiving objects properly. Neither pictures nor models but the objects themselves are the best illustrations at the beginning: for they impart the freshest impressions and lead to vivid and vigorous perceptions. Memory should not receive training by mere words when objects are concerned, nor should it receive a kind of general training, but should be trained on definite objects that are to be remembered. Similar principles are valid in respect to the training of the understanding. The perfection of the faculty depends on the degree of perfection with which the particular image-concept was formed originally and is retained. Perfection of the power of understanding is dependent on the growth of sensuous perception, sensuous attention and on the development of memory and imagination. For this reason nothing is more injurious to the culture of the faculty of understanding than a careless and vague manner of perceiving and observing. As the thought-concepts originate in image-concepts, in which the dissimilar elements are obliterated (a process which is called abstraction) the educator should take care that the child receive a copious number of these fundamental image-concepts. The more numerous they are, the more homogeneous elements they supply and the clearer will the thought-concept be in our consciousness. Hence we must patiently await the growth of these original image-concepts and avoid leading the child prematurely to deal in abstractions. The sooner perceptions are used for the formation of abstractions, the less fact material for abstraction can be collected. Soon the latter will be exhausted and further progress crippled. Let children remain children. It is nature's will that at the beginning the sensuous element preponderates in the young human being, that afterwards reproductive intelligence, and lastly productive intelligence, experience their principal development. This order should not be disturbed by the educator. In regard to the training of character and of the feelings we meet in Beneke's philosophy with similar practical results. Absence of moral dimness and weakness is the basis of all that is good in man. Practical virtues can be reduced to six classes. (1) General vigor of the practical mental formations or products. (2) Agreement of inclination and interest with the true value of things. (3) Proper extent and limitation of inclinations or interests and their harmonious agreement. (4) Clearness, firmness, connection and culture of the practical faculties. (5) Copiousness, correctness, refinement in the acquired training of such series of image concepts as relate to the finding of adequate means for any definite aim. (6) Training and culture of the faculties for action so that they result in sufficient skill and useful habits. A thoroughly vigorous training of the soul may be regarded as the basis of all other virtues. We can educate a powerful will to the extent only in which we can keep the soul free from hurtful and confusing impressions. There is nothing more injurious to a vigorous development of the will-power than obscure and confused image-concepts or expectations: we should be careful to guard the child against these. Avoid the growth of all strong, violent and lasting desires and appetites by satisfying every needful demand of the child which is natural and not excessive. Above all other things let the educator guard the child's soul against envy, jealousy and similar passions as they arise even in the youngest child by unreasonable preferment of, praise of, and rewards or presents to, other children. If we give to the child an occupation adequate to his powers, if we abstain from useless commands and prohibitions, if we are careful not to cause wants and desires that cannot be gratified, if we banish from education all petting that is at once effeminating and weakening, there will be no obstinacy. Should it make its appearance nevertheless, punishment ought to be inflicted, but there must be no scolding nor subsequent ill will or resentment on the part of the educator.

If tendencies to recur often to certain classes of frequent image-concepts of pleasure and desire, combine and unite in the mind, we call this an inclination. In case these elements that produce inclinations are very strong and numerous, we call their result propensities and passions. "There is nothing innate in the human soul except the general character of the primary faculties, i. e. a certain degree of susceptibility to irritations or excitations, vivacity and vigor." The same is true in regard to the moral principle and the appreciative faculty by which the mind judges of right and wrong, good and evil. As the moral code of law is not given to the mind originally, no consciousness of its value exists in the young mind, nor is there any estimation of the Good before the development of the soul has reached the point which is requisite for the growth of such moral inclination or appreciation. Hence, educational science must suggest the following as the task of moral education. (1) To cause and favor the development of the higher moral appreciations or estimations in regard to all the conditions and all activity of life that are based on these appreciations. (2) To keep under the right control the development of the lower moral appreciations or estimations, so that they do not arise too frequently and become too strong.

As regards religious culture, less depends on comprehension of its principles than on their harmony with the higher moral and psychical needs, on enthusiasm, devotion, strength and character. As these can be gained by a great number of "vestiges" or "traces" only, religious training must begin with the earliest childhood. In religious instruction prudence and care is necessary in regard to whatever is yet removed far beyond the feeling of the child, because otherwise mistaken views and prejudices may arise that will last through life. The positive characteristics of the different forms of religions should not be presented in the earlier period of youth nor should any stress be laid on the contrast in which one form of religion stands to others. True religious culture must be built on a deep foundation in the innermost heart, it must be strong enough to give to the human being character and strength of resistance when the world surrounds him on all sides with its allurements or attacks. This strength can be acquired by a great variety of adequate vestiges or traces only. Mere instruction is insufficient. The principal condition is that the soul of the educator himself be filled and animated with the religion he teaches. He must carefully select the time when the child may be expected to be most susceptible, and should guard against connecting the conception of God with the sensation of fear. True religious belief will be acquired only when all the surroundings of the child religiously co-operate.

Instruction, says Beneke, deals almost exclusively with image-concepts and the acquisition of skill; education, however, concerns itself principally with the training of the feelings and the formation of character. Both should pass over into each other continually: education must work for instruction. Without attention, for instance, instruction cannot be successful. In the same way instruction that deserves its name should serve the purposes of education. The distinction between formal and material culture is void: There is neither purely formal nor purely material culture; each mental vestige or trace of instruction is at the same time mental power. Neither is the distinction between studies that teach practical knowledge and studies that give ideal culture or mental discipline a valid one. Culture-studies impart knowledge as well as the others, although the knowledge may be of a different kind, and ideal culture is certainly practical in at least one respect, as it gives mental training that may be utilized in any practical activity.

The principal rules for instruction are: 1. Instruction must find the conditional factors for its future educational results in the soul. Hence instruction should be connected, continuous and unbroken. It should begin with the particular or with whatever presents itself immediately to external or internal perception. Thus, for instance, arithmetic should not begin with the abstract number but with objects, grammar with examples from which rules and definitions may be derived, moral or religious instruction with immediate feelings.

2. The several factors in instruction must be made to lend their co-operation in as perfect a way as possible. In order to cause the image-concepts required by the study to rise in the soul it is advisable to have but a single principal study taught for some length of time. The pupil should be made to prepare the lesson; he may assist weaker pupils in their work or instruct them. The teacher should manifest love for his work, earnestness and thoroughness, should not withhold warm praise when he notices the progress of his pupils, should point out the usefulness of the study and should make instruction as interesting as possible. A study should neither be too difficult nor too easy, should not overcrowd the pupil with facts, should require self-activity and give information not merely for the wants of the school room, but for life. The subject matter of instruction, says Beneke, is taken partly from the external, partly from the internal world. The image-concepts of the external world rest on the basis of sensuous perception; those of the inner world on the basis of the perception of consciousness. The most concrete perceptions of the external world we find in purely descriptive geography and astronomy, in purely narrative history, in as far as it relates to the external world. A half abstract view of the external world is contained in natural history and philosophy and chemistry and a highly abstract view in geometry and arithmetic. The inner world appears in the most concrete representation in language, more abstractly in grammar, still more so in logic, psychology and in the science of morals and religion. External skill and dexterity may be considered first in respect to the support which the psychical element receives from the physical, and next, in how far the physical is made to serve the development of the psychical in its relation to the external world. To the

first class belong calisthenics and gymnastic exercises, to the second penmanship, reading, drawing, painting, music, &c. Instruction in language is, according to Beneke, the central point of all instruction. We have to distinguish in it four elements: 1. The acquisition of language as such. 2. Communication of mental combination by language. 3. The practice by which the pupil learns to use his vocabulary for the expression of thought with certainty and skill. 4. The acquisition of clear and conscious knowledge of the relations and forms of mental development: their comprehension in a special kind of image-concepts and thoughts—i. e. grammatical instruction in the widest sense of the term. Of these elements the child when he enters school brings with him a more tolerably complete preparation for his mother tongue than for any other part of the study of language. The new knowledge that the school is to furnish in this study is instruction in the visible characters of written language, and their synthesis in orthography. The mental associations that have instinctively been formed in regard to language have to be analyzed and their rational basis be brought to clear consciousness. This method of instruction in the mother tongue that begins with analysis is peculiar to it and distinguishes it from the instruction in other languages, where instruction must begin with the particular and use synthesis to rise to more complex forms.

The means for instruction in orthography (spelling) are the analysis of words, etymological explanations, practice in the use of words, copying, comparison of the copied words with the original, reading during which attention is paid to the spelling. In teaching grammar to children belonging to the higher classes of society, it is not necessary to go beyond the general logical basis of the science; but with children from the lower classes of life instruction in grammar must go further and present to them a great many examples of correct writing and speaking, &c. The aim of all instruction should be productivity in the mother tongue; all other instruction should be brought into immediate connection with instruction in language. In instruction in foreign languages both the audible characters or expressions and their connections with the ideas for which they stand must again be learned; hence by this the mind receives culture also in this direction. The intellectual horizon grows very much wider, and we are more thoroughly freed from the narrow view by which our form and expression of feeling, conceiving and thinking, have appeared as the only possible and necessary ones; by stripping ourselves from the one-sidedness which is the unavoidable consequence of isolation, we train our mind into a many-sided susceptibility and versatility.

Ancient languages afford the highest culture of this kind. In studying them the pupil assimilates the views and modes of thought which underlie these writings, and by admitting into his soul these ideas, he gives to his mental development such a breadth, to his mental power such a versatile and many-sided culture as cannot be imparted by the study of any modern language.

Instruction in history is the complement of that in language, inasmuch as it presents psychical effects and phenomena; another complement is found in instruction in morals and religion. While instruction in history lies more in the field of conception, of logic and æsthetics, morals and religion deal more with the training of the emotions and of character. Mathematics is an invaluable study for formal culture on account of its clearness, thoroughness, the stringency and the objective character in its scientific construction; to this may be added its material importance and extensive use in life, and the fact that it governs in the highest degree most of the other sciences, and hence must be considered an essential element of human knowledge in general.

The natural sciences and geography are of less educational value, for with the exception of the part in which they admit of the application of mathematics, they require no intellectual activity beyond the formation of groups or series of image-concepts. The acquisition of talent for the latter, however, is not without importance, when we consider the value of the habit of grasping external phenomena with wide-awake readiness and energy.

The only kinds of skill and dexterity that are of relatively high value are those that are purely the manifestations of physical strength, and those that express certain activities of our emotional nature. While the former are important for the bodily health of the child, the external activity which is symbolic of certain intellectual and emotional processes, such as we find it in declaiming, gesticulation, singing or music in general, in drawing, in the manual production of form of any kind, is of great importance in the culture of intellectual faculties as well as in the training of emotional nature and character. But whereas their higher development requires certain special talents, it cannot be made subject of instruction in general.

These studies, taking them as a whole, are of different importance to the different kinds of schools. The different kinds of schools and institutions of learning are conditioned, on one hand by the nature of the human being, and on the other by circumstances and the requirements of life. In the common school those are educated whose calling it will be to operate with the physical world by their physical strength. Hence it might be said that the preparation for their calling lies beyond the limit of school instruction. But granting that the pupil's vocation required his physical powers exclusively, they are not to work as pieces of machinery, but as human beings, that is, with conscious understanding. The pupils, moreover, as human beings, will stand also in other and higher relations to mankind. Hence we must initiate them, as far as time and circumstances permit, into the intellectual progress of their surrounding world. Such instruction need not go beyond the immediate surroundings, nor is it necessary to lead to fundamental causes even in this. Hence there is no need for teaching any language in the common school except the mother tongue, and instruction in the history and geography of foreign nations should and must be limited to a most general outline.

The pupil of a grammar school or "Real-schule" [English high school] may be supposed to find his future calling in an activity that deals not with the intellectual but with the physical world; but this activity is an intellectual one. Inasmuch as the pupils will have to deal with the physical world, they must be made acquainted with its objects and laws; in as far as the pupils' activity is to be intellectual, we must make them feel at home in the intellectual world also; they are, however, not to be led to the fundamental, philosophical, and historical presuppositions. It is sufficient to make accessible to them the nearest or immediate culture, that of the present day, such as can be gained from the study of modern languages and modern history. The fundamental idea of the Latin high school or the academy (German Gymnasium) is the preparation for some intellectual activity in regard to the intellectual world. The main study in schools of this kind is that of ancient languages, not for their sake, but as means for the before mentioned end. No important province of human knowledge or activity must remain entirely unknown to the pupils of a school of that order, as they are expected to acquire the highest culture, and general directive ability. They should obtain a general knowledge of the material sciences and mathematics, and should study the elements of the science of morals and religion. By these studies the faculties of the pupil should receive sufficient training, to form a basis upon which the college or university can build the superstructure of the highest culture available in our times.

The psychological and pedagogical views of Beneke have found favor with many German teachers, but have not attracted so much the attention of philosophers. Mr. Dressler was the first person who called closer attention to it, by a popular treatise: "Beneke on Psychology as a natural science." F. Ueberweg also assisted in the attempt to obtaining recognition for Beneke's Psychology and Pedagogics by the essay "The Development of Consciousness by the Teacher and Educator." Among other writings of this class the following may be mentioned: Otto Boerner "The Science of Consciousness in its Didactic and Pedagogical Applications," and "The Freedom of Will, Responsibility and Punishment in their Fundamental Principles," and especially the works of Fr. Dittes, which are so very suggestive for teachers: "The Human Consciousness, its Psychological Explanation and Educational Training;" "The Principle and Educational Importance of Æsthetics;" "Religion and Religious Training;" "The Natural Science of Morals and the Art of Moral Training;" "Treatise on Ethical Freedom with Special Reference to the Systems of Spinoza, Leibnitz and Kant." The work that did most for the propagation of Beneke's psychology is "Dr. F. C. Beneke's New Psychology, presented to the friends of Objective Truth in a popular form" by Dr. G. Raue, Professor of the Medical Academy of Philadelphia, fourth enlarged and revised edition by Joh. Gottl. Dressler, Principal of Normal School in Bautzen, (Published in Mayence, Germany, 1868). A translation of this book into the Dutch language appeared in 1859.

There have been many opponents to Beneke's Psychology, as might be expected. Karl Schmidt finds fault with it because it is the product of self-observation, which in itself is always of very doubtful success. "Self-observation" says Waitz "is almost impossible, because our life is subject to continuous changing and flowing. By far the greater part of the changing states of the mind can neither be produced nor retained at our will. The statement that we can observe our mental self involves an error of observation, as every state of the soul loses intensity when the soul is at the same time observing it. For the mind must split itself into two parts in this process, it cannot sink itself altogether in an activity, if it wants to observe this activity at the same time. But how can such an unavoidable error of observation be corrected? The state of the soul must have weakened to a certain degree before it lays itself open to observation. In the strictest sense self-observation is impossible, because the observation of a psychical state, or the occupation of the soul in its contemplation is a new state of the soul that succeeds the one that is to be observed. Hence this second and the subsequent state of the soul would have to be observed again, to know the totality of the phenomena that arise in the soul." "As long as Beneke"—says Schmidt—"besides observing the activity of his own soul observes that of others, this observation is one belonging to natural science, but he leaves this basis the moment he deals exclusively with self-observation and assumes that whatever belongs exclusively to him, to his inner life is true in general of the soul-life of all human beings." Beneke's adherents maintain in opposition to this objection that every mind unbiased in the observation of mental phenomena will find confirmation of Beneke's view in himself and others; that the practical teacher in particular has the opportunity almost every hour to observe how souls will obey if treated according to the principles of the "new" psychology.

Schmidt says furthermore: "Beneke did not recognize the emotional and volitional nature in its true principles. Hence in the development of the pupil he does not know how to make use of all the elements of culture which religion contains. Hence, he does not recognize the full educational import and value of natural sciences; he sees in them merely groups and series of conceptions. Nor has education the power which Beneke attributes to it: according to him all the faculties and gifts which a pupil may have by nature consist of the ability to receive and retain sensuous perceptions and sensations, to group and separate them according to similarity and dissimilarity, &c. And lastly Beneke errs in his view of the essence of education, when he says that the aim of education is to raise untrained reason to a state of training and culture and to elevate the pupil to the position occupied by the educator. This is, as Graefe says, the very excess of egoism, and as G. Baur remarks, the pupil remains without any divine impulse and education without a divine aim." In answer to this the adherents of Beneke's psychology reply that the founder himself acknowledged that his work as well as any other work of human hand was capable of improvement. They think on the other hand, that Beneke's system is beyond all doubt the most perfect one ever set forth in Psychology or Pedagogics. The formerly obscure doctrine of the emotions is elucidated and the principle of religion is more clearly explained than had been the case before. The distinction between education and instruction is more sharply defined than was possible previously, and the success of practical education is better secured on the basis of this "new" psychology than according to to the principles of the old science.

Gieseler raises the following objections to Beneke's system (Diesterweg's Rheinische Blaetter, November—December 1861): According to this psychology the human soul is an absolute void out of which the primary faculties emerge continually like the unrestrained arms of a polypus to grasp things, to hold more or less of what has been grasped, to utilize into new strength the nourishment that has been greedily devoured, and at the very last all this is barely fused together into the common stock of general consciousness. These primary faculties are to be homogeneous and to condition all knowledge, otherwise they cannot be the original principle; they must not have any positive content in order not to exclude the universal validity of his natural law. Except a formal difference of these primary faculties (in regard to vigor, vivacity and susceptibility) no gift or disposition that is born with us is admissible, no natural talent, no innate ideas, no ethical tendency. But can any educator close his eyes against the very contrary experience? Are there not talents that develop from the very beginning in a definite and limited direction? If Beneke's views were true and if these talents consisted merely of a greater vigor &c. of the primary faculties. would it not follow that these talents should manifest themselves not in a definite direction but in a wider sense as general talent? Does not a definite predisposition manifest itself in the child's inclinations? Whence, otherwise, the well known psychological fact that kleptomania develops in persons whose previous condition in life makes another explanation impossible? Has not every educator frequent opportunities to observe, that of two children, one like a bee gathers nought but honey from even a poisonous plant, while the other will find but the poison even under the most wholesome influences. The infinite variety of dispositions and inclinations which are found even in little children cannot be explained by the theory of a mere formal difference of primary faculties. Our decision about the question of natural talents has a far higher significance in another respect. If there is any principle in man that is divine, free, eternal, it must be something original that is born with us. If the higher spiritual wants, views and aspirations, the ideas of the true, the good and the beautiful, the religious and moral sentiments and free will are merely the products of a fortunate combination of psychical forms, then Beneke may be right in saying that the sole distinction between the human and animal souls lies in the relative vigor of the primary faculties. The ethical principle according to Beneke is shown to be the highest good by means of our appreciative faculty. But this does not explain how even a child may have the feeling of duty, the sense for the ethical commandments, as with him the appreciative faculty could not have developed itself for want of any empirical basis that determines ethical value. But we know how frequently this ethical judgment is found in children in its purest form. It is likewise inexplicable how it is possible to gain such a normal basis or scale for moral estimation or appreciation, of which Beneke says that it underlies all ethical feeling, without having these feelings first. Conscience is said to be the feeling that our action varies from the estimation of right which is valid for all human beings. But how can we obtain this consciousness of universal validity without previous ethical feeling. If right ethical estimation depends on the higher or lower development of our psychical faculties it remains inexplicable how by wrong doing that injures others the development of our own is lessened or interfered with. Perhaps by the formation of other groups of emotional concepts? But such formation would presuppose sympathetic sentiments, which must be innate as they cannot be accounted for by natural development.

The attribute of novelty, which Beneke's psychology claims for itself, is not admitted by the adherents to Herbart's doctrines. J. W. Nachlowsky in the "Magazine for Exact Philosophy" says: "If Beneke says that the 'new' psychology stands so high above all former knowledge of the soul, that it can hardly be called the same science, it becomes an indispensable duty to examine in how far Beneke's psychology may claim the credit of being a novelty. Can Beneke's principles be said to be new ? Not at all for Herbart advanced the idea long ago, that the soul was a simple being and hence could not have a plurality of faculties, dispositions, powers, nor any innate ideas, categories, tendencies &c.—whatever of this is found in the grown soul is of temporal origin. Hence he deemed it necessary to inquire into the elements of the life of the soul. He did not assert this merely but demonstrated it sufficiently by means of metaphysics, experience and mathematics, and applied it many times in his educational writings before Beneke published his psychological work. Herbart has the merit of stringent consistency; for it is not he that ejected the abstract faculty of the soul from his system on one side to allow the concrete primary faculty to steal in on the other, as is the case in Beneke's system. Beneke's method is neither new nor is it the method of natural science in the proper sense.' Herbart, however, long before Beneke, examined the forces that influence the soul in an empirical way and exhibited fully and exactly the laws according to which they work in his 'Statics and Mechanics of the Mind' in the mathematical way in which scientists pursue their investigations.

"Beneke instead of entering upon the details of the phenomena, deals with vague generalities. Instead of considering the true active forces, the elements of psychical life, he falls into a quite unlogical dualism and attempts to talk us into a belief into 'two species of elements,' (the primary faculties and the irritations) but fails to supply the necessary, close connection between the knowledge derived from inner experience and the explanatory hypothesis. Is Beneke's philosophy new in its results ? Just as little. The loudly announced "highly important disclosures" are after all merely formal distinctions in many cases, and we find in the end that we have received new words instead of new ideas, nor are we in any way satisfied with the result presented to us. According to Beneke the soul appears (1) as an altogether immaterial being, consisting (!) of certain primary systems which are not merely in themselves but also among themselves a unit and form one being. (2) As a sensuous being, i. e., the primary faculties of the soul are susceptible of certain impressions from without by irritations, which are seized by these faculties and retained by them. On the distinction between man and animal Beneke says 'We can express this distinction best by ascribing to the former a *spiritual* sensuousness.' Whoever can accept such assertions as new disclosures or as disclosures at all, is easily satisfied as far as speculation is concerned. Neither are Beneke's Fundamental processes of psychical development new." In many places we find rather weak reminiscences of (Herbart's) "threshold of consciousness, the weakening and strengthening of susceptibility, the impulse toward equilibrium, fusion, complication of image-concepts, apperception &c." But all these are so defaced and tarnished by the slime from the bottom of the 'primary faculties' that a distinct outline cannot be discerned. The great fault of these primary faculties, their obscurity, aye, their utter inconceivability become most obvious when we speak of their application. We are told that for each successive sensation a special primary faculty is consumed in such a way that each new sensation of this kind requires the re-formation of a new corresponding primary faculty. But although we are told that one of these primary faculties is consumed every time in this process, every mental trace or vestige (i. e., the reproduction of a former sensation) is to consist of two elements, the primary faculty and the irritation. (!) From this it appears as if the former had been consumed and were unconsumed at the same time. The adhesion of the irritations to the primary faculties; the mutual permeation of the two species of elements which is sometimes very complete and lasting and at other times less so, the loosening and falling off of the irritations: and last but not least the connection into which the primary faculties enter with the other mental formations—all this let him understand who can. Beneke talks continually about natural laws and natural science, but ignores and almost abominates the natural sciences, especially physiology even in questions where it is indispensable to psychology (as in the theory of sensation &c.). Judging from all this we may in regard to the main principles venture to assert without any scruples: Whatever can be maintained of this 'new' psychology is not new and whatever is new cannot be maintained."

The adherents of Herbart's as well as those of Beneke's Psychology admit that the system to which they give the preference is as little free from blemishes and faults as another human work. The veil which surrounds the mysterious Image at Sais—our Psyche—has not been altogether lifted. Since this Psyche appears, as far as we know, to be the highest development of existence, its entire unveiling would be equivalent to the solution of the world-problem, a solution in which we shall hardly succeed here in our sublunary sphere." It cannot be doubted however that education has been benefited much by both Herbart's and Beneke's doctrines. The earnest study of such thought-systems frees the spirit and elevates the practical activity of teacher and educator from routine work and pedantry to the dignity of an artistic and creative worker. It supplies the fixed fulcrum for the lever of education. The question that remains is: on what ground is there more firmness, assurance and fertility. Karl Schmidt finds Beneke's unquestionable merit mainly in his doctrine of the relation of concept-series and his critique (based on Herbart) of the psychical faculties as taught by the Psychology and Pedagogics of his time.

THE IDEA OF MIND; OR, THE INTERNAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF MATTER.

By Charles Theodore Bayrhoffer.

In a former essay (Journal of Spec. Phil., No. 37, Vol. VII.,) I have shown that matter, or the extended, sensible substance, is the chain and interaction of monads or simple selfs. These monads are the many primitive points or limitations of the one universal whole of being. The many or the multitude of units can never be *created* by a single universal unity, nor the universal unity by the many monads, because either of these ideas involves a logical contradiction, inasmuch as every side of the whole, the multitude and the universal unity, to *create* or generate the other one, must *presuppose* the other one. The absolute unity must be *self-contradictory*, to create the many. It must be the one and not the one, the *negation* of the one; and to be this negation, the